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NOTES
NOTE: A DEFINITION OF "INVESTMENT
CONTRACTS" AND EQUITABLE DEFENSES TO SUIT
FOR RESCISSION FOR NONREGISTRATION UNDER
THE ARKANSAS SECURITIES ACT
The plaintiffs, Schultz and Watkins, each purchased from the
defendant, Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. (RPM), joint venture inter-
ests in a proposed apartment complex to be constructed and man-
aged by RPM.' Each plaintiffs investment of $47,000 represented
twenty percent of the equity capital invested in the project.2 The
equity capital was used to leverage a Federal Housing Administra-
tion loan.3 At no time were the joint venture interests registered as
securities with the Arkansas Securities Commission, nor was an
exemption from registration obtained.
Plaintiffs learned of the investment opportunity from an asso-
ciate who had received "confidential information" from RPM out-
lining the project. The "confidential information" amounted to an
offer to sell ten percent interest units in a tax shelter type of invest-
ment. Plaintiffs invested in the project primarily as a tax shelter.4
The Internal Revenue Service, however, disallowed a substan-
tial portion of plaintiffs' claimed deductions from the project on
their 1972 returns.5 Plaintiffs then tendered their interests back to
RPM, claiming that the joint venture interests were unregistered
securities' and that, under the Arkansas Securities Act, they were
1. The joint venture agreement was executed by Schultz, Watkins, and two other inves-
tors, together with Apartment Developers Corp., Pickens-Bond (a subsidiary of Rector-
Phillips-Morse, Inc. (RPM)), and Phillips-Morse Construction Co. A separate trust agree-
ment placed title to the project in Stuttgart Apartments, Inc., holding for the benefit of the
joint adventurers. Under the trust agreement, Stuttgart Apartments, Inc., was given full
power to develop, manage, mortgage, and sell the property. Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse,
Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 774, 552 S.W.2d 4, 7 (1977).
2. Other private investors purchased the remainder of the joint venture shares.
3. Stuttgart Apartments, Inc., whose directors and officers were employees of RPM,
had effective total control over the project, and the plaintiffs and other investors had no
obligation or right to manage the property or otherwise exercise ownership over it.
4. The "confidential information" also promised that a partnership income tax return
would be furnished annually by an independent certified public accountant showing the
deductions allowable for that year. Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 773,
552 S.W.2d 4, 6 (1977).
5. The IRS made a deficiency assessment against both plaintiffs, based largely upon
the IRS contention that many of the "start up" expenses should have been capitalized and
deducted over a period of years, rather than taken the first year. Id. at 775, 552 S.W.2d at 7.
6. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1256 (Repl. 1966).
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entitled to rescind the purchase.7 There was no allegation of any
fraud or misrepresentation in connection with the sale. RPM de-
fended on the grounds (1) that the joint venture interests were not
"securities" within the meaning of the Act; (2) that if they were
securities, they were exempt from registration because they had
been offered only to a small number of potential investors; (3) that
the plaintiffs were barred by laches and estoppel, as the length of
time that had elapsed since the sale was such that plaintiffs, as
sophisticated investors with special knowledge of the securities
field, should be estopped from seeking rescission of the contract.
The chancellor held that the interests purchased by plaintiffs
were "securities" within the meaning of the Arkansas Securities Act
but that the private offering exemption provided by the Act was
applicable to the transaction and that registration was therefore not
required.' He further found that plaintiffs' claim of rescission was
barred by laches and waiver because of their knowledge and experi-
ence in the field of securities.'
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, but on somewhat dif-
ferent grounds. The court agreed that plaintiffs' action was barred
by equitable principles 0 and also confirmed that the joint venture
interests were securities within the meaning of the Arkansas Securi-
ties Act. The court concluded, however, that the transaction should
have been registered." Two justices dissented, and one did not par-
7. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1241 (Repl. 1966) provides, "It is unlawful for any person to offer
or sell any security in this State unless (1) it is registered under this act ... or (2) the security
or transaction is exempted under Section 14 [§ 67-1248]." Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1256 (Repl.
1966) provides the remedy of an action at law or in equity for purchase price plus interest
and attorney's fees.
8. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1248(b)(9) (Repl. 1966).
9. Both plaintiffs were registered stockbrokers and served as vice-presidents of Ste-
phens, Inc., a Little Rock investment firm.
10. The supreme court based its findings on estoppel and laches rather than on waiver
and laches, the bases of the chancellor's decision.
11. The question of whether the securities qualified for an exemption from registration
pursuant to the Arkansas Securities Act is not discussed herein. Briefly, the appellees con-
tended that the transaction was exempt from registration requirements as being one involving
a private offering. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1248(b)(9) (Repl. 1966) exempts from registration
offerings to twenty-five or fewer people within the state when no commission or remuneration
is received directly or indirectly for soliciting prospective buyers. A proof of exemption must
be filed with the Commissioner. As no proof of exemption was filed by RPM, they relied on
Rule 14(b)(15) of the Securities Commissioner of the State of Arkansas, [1977] 1 Blue Sky
L. Rep. (CCH) 7614. Rule 14(b)(15) dispenses with the requirement for the proof of exemp-
tion when five or fewer persons form a corporation or limited partnership if the requirements
of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1248(b)(9) (Repl. 1966) are otherwise complied with. The court found
that the exemption did not apply to the circumstances because remuneration was paid to
RPM both directly and indirectly. The court noted that Rule 14(b)(15) is designed to permit
small numbers of investors to form their own business venture, such as family stores, without
UALR LAW JOURNAL
ticipate. Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 552
S.W.2d 4 (1977).
The regulation of securities in this country began on the state
level with twentieth century statutes commonly called Blue Sky
laws . 2 The primary purpose of these laws is to protect the public
from deceit and fraud in securities transactions. Most acts contain
three basic elements: antifraud provisions relating to securities
transactions, provisions for the registration of securities, and provi-
sions for the regulation of dealers and brokers. 3 These state Blue
-Sky laws regulate intrastate sales; transactions involving the use of
means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce or of the mails
are governed by federal securities laws. 4 In 1959 the General Assem-
bly adopted the Arkansas Securities Act,15 a modification of the
Uniform Securities Act. 6
Whenever a regulatory agency or a court attempts to put securi-
ties laws and regulations into effect, a basic question arises: what
is a security? The most common and obvious types of securities are
stocks and bonds, but many other less conventional investments are
included and subject to regulation. Investments in muskrats, 7 tung
trees, 8 silver foxes, 9 gold bars,20 and whiskey warehouse receipts
2'
are just a few of the many unconventional investment schemes that
have been found to fall under the regulation of state or federal
securities acts. Each of these schemes has been found to be an
"investment contract." Both the federal act 2 and the Arkansas Se-
curities Act include the term "investment contract" in their defini-
filing documents to perfect an exemption under the Arkansas Securities Act. Schultz v.
Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 784-85, 552 S.W.2d 4, 12 (1977).
12. 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 25 (2d ed. 1951). Such acts were aimed at protecting
investors from promoters who "would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple." Mulvey,
Blue Sky Laws, 36 Can. L. Times 37 (1916).
13. 1 L. Loss, supra note 12, at 33.
14. Securities which are offered to the public through the mails or channels of interstate
commerce must be registered with the SEC by the issuer. The Commission does not approve
any security or pass on its merits. It merely assures the public that the registration statement
is accurate and complete. A prospectus containing basic information about the security must
be given to the buyer. 1 L. Loss, supra note 12, at 130. The facts of this case did not fall under
SEC regulation because only intrastate commerce was involved.
15. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-1235 to -1261 (Repl. 1966).
16. The Uniform Securities Act has been adopted by thirty-three states. Schultz v.
Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 778, 552 S.W.2d 4, 8 (1977).
17. State v. Robbins, 185 Minn. 202, 240 N.W. 456 (1932).
18. SEC v. Tung Corp., 32 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ill. 1940).
19. SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
20. SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distributors, Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
21. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974).
22. Federal Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970).
[Vol. 1
NOTES
tions.23 The Arkansas Act also includes the term "certificate of par-
ticipation in a profit-sharing agreement." These catch-all phrases
increasingly have been the focal point of litigation on the question
of the scope of securities regulation. Recent cases on this point have
resulted in the application of securities laws, both state and federal,
to a wide variety of schemes and promotions not commonly thought
of as "securities. '2 4 The Arkansas court had not previously con-
strued these terms. At least four tests have been applied to this
problem by other courts: the Howey test, the revised Howey test,
the "risk capital" test, and the nondefinitional or case-by-case ap-
proach.
The federal view of the meaning of "investment contract" is
commonly referred to as the Howey test. In SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp. the Supreme Court laid the groundwork for the
Howey definition by emphasizing substance over form in securities
regulation. The offerings in Joiner were leasehold subdivisions of
two and a half to twenty acres surrounding the proposed drilling site
of an exploratory oil well. The sales literature emphasized the char-
acter of the scheme as an investment. 21 In construing these contracts
to be within the meaning of "investment contracts," the Court
said it was not the nature of the assets offered that determines the
applicability of the act, but rather the character given to the invest-
ment by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the
economic inducements held out to the prospect.
27
In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.2" the Court elaborated on the Joiner
ideas and defined "investment contract" as "any contract, transac-
tion, or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party." 9 The offerings in Howey were a combi-
23. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1247(1) (Repl. 1966) defines "security" as
any note; stock; treasury stock; bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness; certifi-
cate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement; collateral-trust
certificate; preorganization certificate or subscription; transferable share; invest-
ment contract; variable annuity contract; voting-trust certificate; certificate of
deposit for a security; certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas, or mining
title or lease .... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as
a "security" or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of
the foregoing.
24. See generally cases cited notes 17-21 supra.
25. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
26. Id. at 346.
27. Id. at 352-53. Both lower courts had found that the scheme amounted simply to
sales and assignments of legal and legitimate oil and gas leases. Id. at 348.
28. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
29. Id. at 298.
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nation of a land sales contract and a service contract for citrus
groves in Florida. Most purchasers were tourists from other areas of
the country who lacked the knowledge or resources to manage the
groves themselves. The land was sold in single strips of one or more
rows of trees with forty-eight trees to a row. The average purchase
was 1.33 acres.30 In deciding that this offering was a "security"
subject to federal regulation, the Court emphasized the following
elements of an investment contract: (1) the investment of money (2)
in a common enterprise (3) with the expectation of profit (4) to be
derived "solely" from the efforts of others.3' Although this definition
has been widely criticized, 2 it has been followed in many states, as
well as in the federal courts.3
Most criticism of the Howey test centers on its mechanical
nature, particularly the requirement that the management of the
project come solely from the promoter or a third party.34 Under a
strict application of the Howey test, any participation by the inves-
tor renders the contract a nonsecurity.
Recent case law has resulted in the development of a revised
Howey test.35 In these cases courts claiming to adhere to the Howey
test have dispensed with the requirement that the profits come
"solely" from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. Instead,
they have recognized that securities regulation may easily be cir-
cumvented by requiring a modicum of investor effort.36 In addition,
these cases recognize that in some schemes the efforts of the investor
are not material to the success or failure of the enterprise, leaving
him still at the mercy of the promoters for realization of profit on
his investment. 37 This new interpretation of Howey has been applied
to pyramid type schemes typified by SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enter-
30. Id. at 295.
31. Id. at 298.
32. See Bitter v. Hoby's Int'l, Inc., 498 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Central
Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974); Nash Assocs., Inc., v. Lum's of Ohio,
Inc., 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1973); Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There
a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 367 (1976); Long, An Attempt to
Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 Okla. L. Rev.
135 (1971).
33. For a list of states recognizing the Howey test, see Annot. 47 A.L.R.3d 1375, 1380-
82 (1973 & Supp. 1977).
34. SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973). The
Howey court itself said, "The statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors is
not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae." SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 301 (1946).
35. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glen W.
Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).




prises, Inc.35 Although Turner's organization ostensibly sold self-
improvement courses, it actually induced persons to invest money
in the company in return for the right to earn commissions by induc-
ing others to invest.3 Strict application of the Howey test would
have allowed this type of frequently fraudulent scheme to escape the
securities laws, since the "investor" was actively engaged in sales
work. Revising the Howey test, the Ninth Circuit recognized the
need for liberal construction of the term "securities" to cover
"[n]ovel, uncommon or irregular devices, whatever they appear to
be."40 Quoting from Howey, the court concluded that the definition
of a security "embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one
that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others
on the promise of profits."4'
In SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,4" almost factually
identical, the Fifth Circuit found that literal application of the
Howey test would frustrate the remedial purpose of the Federal
Securities Act.4 3 The court also found that Howey did not require
the literal application of the "solely from the efforts of others" test."
The Koscot court concluded that the critical inquiry is "whether the
efforts made by those other than the investors are the undeniably
significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the
failure or success of the enterprise."45
Another approach to the problem of defining "investment con-
38. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
39. Id. at 478. For an investment of $2000, the buyer could purchase "Adventure In"
and receive a portable tape recorder, a number of tape-recorded lessons, notebooks, and 110
hours of "group sessions," plus the right to sell "Adventures" to others. For such a $2000 sale,
the seller received a commission of $700. "Adventure IV" was at the peak of the pyramid,
selling for $5000 and entitling the buyer to $2500 for each sold. The Adventurer's actual
function was bringing in prospects to "Adventure Meetings," at which high-pressure sales
tactics were used by Turner employees to sell the plan through extravagant promises of
almost instant wealth. Methods used by the employees included cheering and chanting,
exuberant handshaking, standing on chairs, shouting, and "money-humming." Id. at 479.
40. Id. at 481.
41. Id.; SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
42. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
43. Koscot, a subsidiary of Glen W. Turner, Inc., marketed a pyramid promotion
scheme for the sale of cosmetics. The controlling issue in the case was "whether a literal or
functional approach to the 'solely from the efforts of others' test should be adopted, i.e.,
whether the exertion of some efforts by an investor is inimical to the holding that a promo-
tional scheme falls within the definition of an investment contract." Id. at 479.
44. Id. at 480. The court declared that the Howey test had no "talismanic quality" and
that its strict application no longer occupied an "exalted position" in investment contract
adjudication. Id. at 481.
45. Id. at 483 (quoting from SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476,
482 (9th Cir. 1973)).
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tract" was first articulated by Justice Traynor in Silver Hills Coun-
try Club v. Sobieski." The promoters of the Silver Hills Country
Club financed the purchase of the property and the development of
club facilities by selling club memberships. The club's bylaws
stated that the members had no rights in the income or assets of the
club, only the usual rights to use of facilities. 7 Justice Traynor
found the transaction to be one subject to regulation by California
securities laws because members were risking their capital in the
hope that club facilities would be built. He contrasted this risk with
the usual membership fee entitling the purchaser to use existing
facilities, where there would be no risk. 8 Under Justice Traynor's
risk capital test, it does not matter whether the investor expects a
"return" on his capital in the usual sense. 9 The essential element
is the investment of risk capital in the business venture of another.
The test, by submitting the venture to regulation, affords "those
who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objec-
tives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on
their capital in one form or another"50 (emphasis added).
In Commissioner of Securities v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.,5"
the Hawaii court applied the risk capital test to a pyramid sales
scheme whereby investors become "founder-members" of a pro-
posed retail distribution center." In deciding that the scheme in-
46. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). Although Justice Traynor
did not find the security in this case to be an "investment contract" (a term not discussed in
this case), his reasoning has been applied to later discussions of the term's meaning.
47. Members could be expelled only for misconduct or failure to pay dues. Memberships
were transferable, but only to persons approved by the board of directors. Id. at 813, 361 P.2d
at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
48. "Petitioners are soliciting the risk capital with which to develop a business for
profit. The purchaser's risk is not lessened because the interest he purchases is labelled a
membership. Only because he risks his capital ... can there be any chance that the benefits
of club membership will materialize." Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
49. He found the test applicable to "transactions where capital is placed without expec-
tation of any material benefits." Id.
50. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89. A later California case
illustrative of the "risk capital" test's application to investment contracts is Hamilton Jewel-
ers v. Department of Corporations, 37 Cal. App. 3d 332, 112 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1974). In this
case the court reiterated that California adheres to the risk capital test, finding that the sale
of unmounted diamonds for $500 when the usual price was $500 or more was not a security
because the purchase was adequately secured. The seller promised to pay five percent interest
if the purchaser wished to sell the diamond back within three years. The court ruled that since
the diamonds were not sold for more than their usual value, there was no risk of capital and
therefore no security. Id. at 336, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
51. 52 Haw. 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
52. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., had the express purpose of opening "a retail store
which would sell merchandise only to persons possessing purchase authorization cards." To
raise capital to finance this enterprise, the corporation recruited founder-members who were
told they could earn money by becoming founder-member distributors or founder-member
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volved investment contracts, the Hawaii court focused on the
"substantial premiums" paid by the investors13 as consideration for
the right to receive future income from the corporation. The court
found that this money constituted the offeree's investment or con-
tribution of initial value and, as such, was subject to the risks of the
enterprise. Citing Silver Hills Country Club, the court characterized
the salient feature of securities sales as "public solicitation of ven-
ture capital to be used in a business enterprise."5 The court empha-
sized the "economic reality" of the scheme rather than the labels
attached to it by the promoters. As for the participation of the
investors in the scheme, the court focused on the quality of the
participation and said that investor control would have to include
"practical and actual control over managerial decisions" in order to
negate the finding of a security. 55
Minnesota takes still another approach to the problem of defin-
ing "investment contract," refusing to adopt the Howey definition
or any other inflexible test. Minnesota was one of the first courts to
discuss the term in State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co.5" in 1920. The
court said that an "investment" is the placing of capital or laying
out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its
employment and that a contract or certificate fitting this descrip-
tion is an "investment contract. ' 5' The court then said, "It is better
supervisors. To become a distributor, the investor had to purchase either a cookware set or a
sewing machine for $320. The wholesale value of either was $70. Then the distributor could
earn money by distributing the purchase authorization cards or signing up other distributors,
eventually becoming a founder-member supervisor, at which level he would earn higher fees
and commissions. This scheme is a classic example of a pyramid sales structure. Id. at 648-
49, 485 P.2d at 107.
53. These premiums were the "overcharges" to investors for the merchandise (the dif-
ference between the wholesale value and the amount charged for the cookware and sewing
machines). Id. at 648-49, 485 P.2d at 107-08.
54. Id. at 648, 485 P.2d at 109.
55. Id. at 652, 485 P.2d at 111. The Hawaii court adopted the following test taken from
Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 367, 377 (1967):
[A]n investment contract is created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risk of the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises or repre-
sentations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of
some kind, over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of
the operation of the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control
over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
Id. at 649, 485 P.2d at 109.
56. 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920).
57. Id. at 53, 177 N.W. at 938.
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to determine in each instance whether a security is in fact of such a
character as fairly to fall within the scope of the statute."58 The
Minnesota court reaffirmed this view in 1946 in State v. Lorentz"
and in 1973 in State v. Investors Security Corp.0 when the court
specifically rejected the Howey test or any other definition.
The Arkansas Supreme Court in Schultz adopted the Minne-
sota approach for determing what an "investment contract" is and
refused to give a definition of "investment contract," "security," or
"certificate of interest or participation."'" Because of the Act's es-
sentially remedial nature, the court expressed a preference for keep-
ing the definition of "security" flexible enough "to encompass the
endless succession of new and innovative or old and tried promo-
tional schemes, where the promoters, by design seek to risk the
money or property of others in their venture."62 Among the examples
given by the court were the current uses of limited partnerships with
public investors as the vehicle for conducting business ventures such
as oil and gas leases or herds of cattle. 3 While not stating that these
schemes are always securities, the court did say that the definition
must be broad and flexible enough to allow analysis of all the factors
involved in transactions such as these.
64
Applying this flexible approach in Schultz, the court based its
conclusion that the joint venture interests were "securities" on sev-
eral factors including the "package" nature of the offering, the
"passive" position of the investors, and the manner in which the
project was financed. The court emphasized that the entire scheme
for marketing and managing the apartment complex was put to-
gether by RPM which, either directly or through its affiliates, was
to organize, construct, manage, and control the properties. Since
interests in the project were sold as "units" to investors primarily
interested in tax shelters, the court said these sales were clearly not
mere sales of an interest in real estate. 5 Another factor in the court's
analysis was the "passive investor" status of the plaintiffs. The
58. Id.
59. 221 Minn. 366, 22 N.W.2d 313 (1946)(the sale of cemetery lots for investment pur-
poses constituted a sale of securities).
60. 297 Minn. 1, 209 N.W.2d 405 (1973).
61. The court preferred not to give a narrow construction to the definition of
"securities" within the meaning of the Arkansas Securities Act, favoring instead a case-by-
case review of facts to determine whether a particular scheme falls within the act. Schultz v.
Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 781, 552 S.W.2d 4, 10 (1977).
62. Id. at 777, 552 S.W.2d at 8.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 781, 552 S.W.2d at 11.
66. The court said the scheme was not "a partnership in which a number of persons
[Vol. 1
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court found that the substance of the financing amounted to a secu-
rity transaction, no matter what label it was given. 7 The court
concluded by limiting its holding to the particular facts of Schultz,
stressing that not all general partnerships or joint ventures are se-
curities within the Arkansas Securities Act.68
Schultz's holding is significant because it establishes the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court's flexible approach to determining whether
a transaction is an investment contract. While the factual conclu-
sion that the joint venture interest in the apartment complex was a
security is not altogether surprising in light of relevant cases from
other jurisdictions," it is the court's approach that is important.
The court's refusal to adopt the Howey test or its modified version
takes Arkansas out of what is probably the majority view on this
subject and leaves the potential seller of and investor in unconven-
tional types of investments without clear guidelines.
It should be noted that the scheme in Schultz would have been
a security under the Howey test, the revised Howey test, or Justice
Traynor's "risk capital" test. The court could have reached the
same result by applying any one of the commonly used definitions.70
Although the court claimed not to be applying any test in particu-
lar, a substantial amount of "risk capital" language is used in the
opinion."
expected to pool their talents and capital and reap the benefits of their own expertise and
abilities. The . . . investors were mere passive contributors of risk capital who placed their
money in an investment program labeled a 'joint venture."' Id. at 782, 552 S.W.2d at 11.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. The following cases held that contracts for the sale and management of income-
producing realty were securities and subject to regulation: Sire Plan Portfolios, Inc., v. Car-
pentier, 8 Ill. App. 2d 354, 132 N.E.2d 78 (1956)(sale of fractional, undivided interests in an
apartment building); Prohasa v. Hemmer-Miller Development Co., 256 Ill. App. 331 (1930)
(sale of crop-producing farm land with terms of one third down and balance to be paid from
profits from crop sales); State v. Investors Security Corp., 297 Minn. 1, 209 N.W.2d 405 (1973)
(sale of land developers' notes). Cases holding that contracts for the sale and management
of income-producing realty are not securities frequently involve sales of condominiums or
stock cooperatives for use by the investor as a residence. In United Housing Foundation, Inc.,
v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975), the United States Supreme Court ruled that stock
purchased in Co-op City, a state-subsidized nonprofit membership corporation, entitling the
purchaser to lease an apartment in the complex, was not a security because the sole incentive
to purchase was to acquire low-cost living space, not to invest for profit. Accord, Grenader v.
Spitz, 537 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1976).
70. Since the plaintiffs were passive investors, it could be said that they were "led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party," thus satisfying the
Howey test or the revised Howey test. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
Further, since they were furnishing risk capital or venture capital for RPM's packaged com-
plex, the "risk capital" test would clearly apply, too. See Silver Hills Country Club v. So-
bieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 815, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188-89 (1961).
71. For example, "[t]he investors were mere passive contributors of risk capital ...
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In refusing to adopt any definition or test, the court showed a
strong preference for looking to the substance of the financing of the
venture, as opposed to checking off elements of a strict definition.
This approach will allow courts latitude in future determinations of
whether unconventional investment schemes constitute securities.
The Arkansas Securities Act was designed to protect both investors
in ordinary securities, such as stocks and bonds, and persons who
invest in securities disguised as business ventures of other people.
72
In Schultz the court clearly recognized the remedial nature of the
legislation. 3
An action for rescission of a stock transaction may be barred on
equitable principles. Under the theory of equitable estoppel, the
voluntary conduct of a party absolutely precludes him, both at law
and in equity, from asserting property or contract rights which
might otherwise have existed, as against another party who has in
good faith relied on his conduct and has been led because of such
reliance to change his position.74 Authorities are not in agreement
as to whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel can be invoked by
the seller of stock or other securities to defeat a purchaser's action
for rescission of a transaction which violates securities regulations.
Generally, an agreement or instrument which is illegal because it
violates an express mandate of the law or the dictates of public
policy cannot be made valid by the application of equitable estop-
pel.75 In accordance with this rule, it is frequently held that in the
absence of special circumstances, such as the intervening rights of
third parties, the doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be invoked
by the seller of securities to defeat the purchaser's claim that the
transaction was invalid." The exceptions to this rule of law, how-
ever, are as numerous as the instances of its observance, making it
difficult to formulate a clear majority rule on the point.
In jurisdictions where the defense of equitable estoppel is avail-
in an investment program." Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 782, 552
S.W.2d 4, 11 (1977) (emphasis added). The court also said that the definition of security
should be flexible enough "to encompass the endless succession of ... schemes, where the
promoters ... seek to risk the money or property of others in their ventures." Id. at 777, 552
S.W.2d at 8 (emphasis added).
72. Id.
73. Id. See also Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Smith, 228 Ark. 876, 310 S.W.2d 803
(1958).
74. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. Newsom, 142 Ark. 132, 156, 219 S.W.
759, 768 (1920); 3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 804 (5th ed. 1941).
75. Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., 197 U.S. 244 (1905).
76. Martin v. Orvis Bros. & Co., 25 111. App. 3d 238, 323 N.E.2d 73 (1974); Loewenstein
v. Midwestern Inv. Co., 181 Neb. 547, 149 N.W.2d 512 (1967).
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able in securities cases,77 the question of whether the conduct of the
purchaser is sufficient to bar the rescission depends on the facts in
each case. Determinative factors in securities registration cases in-
clude participation in organization or management of the corpora-
tion,7" acceptance of dividends by the buyer,79 the buyer's knowledge
of the violation at the time of the sale, 0 the reliance of the seller on
the buyer's conduct,"' and, occasionally, the experience and sophis-
tication of the buyer.1
2
77. In jurisdictions which hold the sale of unregistered securities to be a void contract,
equitable estoppel is not available as a defense. California is one such jurisdiction. See Regan
v. Albin, 219 Cal. 357, 26 P.2d 475 (1933).
78. Several cases have held purchasers barred from recovery because of participation
in organization or management of the corporation. See, e.g., Krasny v. Richter, 211 So. 2d
612 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Nash v. Jones, 224 Ga. 372, 162 S.E.2d 392 (1968); Moore v.
Manufacturers Sales Co., 335 Mich. 606, 56 N.W.2d 397 (1953); Tucker v. McDell's, Inc., 50
Tenn. App. 62, 359 S.W.2d 597 (1961). Other cases have allowed recovery in spite of participa-
tion. See, e.g., Commissioner of Banks v. Chase Securities Corp., 298 Mass. 285, 10 N.E.2d
472, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 660 (1937); Gales v. Weldon, 282 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1955);
Loewenstein v. Midwestern Inv. Co., 181 Neb. 547, 149 N.W.2d 512 (1967).
79. Plaintiffs were estopped because of acceptance of dividends or attendance of stock-
holder's meetings or both in In re Racine Auto Tire Co., 290 F. 939 (7th Cir. 1923); Farmer's
Union Co-op Royalty Co. v. Little, 180 Okla. 178, 77 P.2d 33 (1938). However, rescission was
allowed in spite of such participation in Commissioner of Banks v. Chase Securities Corp.,
298 Mass. 285, 10 N.E.2d 472, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 660 (1937).
80. "IT]he buyer's mere knowledge of the violation of the blue sky statute at the time
of his purchase will not generally saddle him with the status of one in pari delicto which the
courts will not assist." 3 L. Loss, supra note 12, at 1677. Accord, Brannan, Beckham & Co.
v. Ramsaur, 41 Ga. App. 166, 152 S.E. 282 (1930)(buyer's lack of knowledge that the statute
had been violated held not to be a condition precedent to his recovery); Sampson v. Sapoznik,
124 Cal. App. 2d 704, 269 P.2d 205 (1954). Contra, De Polo v. Greig, 338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d
441 (1954)(stockholders of small corporation who bought second issue knowing the first had
not been registered held estopped from recovery); Stonehocker v. Cassano, 154 Cal. App. 2d
732, 316 P.2d 717 (1957); Ladd v. Knowles, 505 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). However,
the buyer has no affirmative duty to investigate to determine whether the sale to him was
legal. Commissioner of Banks v. Chase Securities Corp., 298 Mass. 285, 325, 10 N.E.2d 472,
497, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 660 (1937); 3 L. Loss, supra note 12, at 1677.
81. Reliance of the seller on the buyer's conduct is often mentioned as a secondary issue.
See generally cases cited notes 78-80, supra.
82. The sophistication and experience of the buyer is often at issue in fraud and misre-
presentation cases when the buyer's reliance on the seller's misrepresentation is a require-
ment for rescission of the sale. In Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D.
Ark. 1972), the court, while acknowledging a material misrepresentation by the seller, refused
the plaintiff-buyer any relief under either federal or Arkansas securities statutes, holding that
the class of investors the securities acts are designed to protect consists of "conscientious
buyers and sellers in good faith." Id. at 1209 (quoting from City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom,
422 F.2d 221, 230 n.10 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970). However, in a Seventh
Circuit case involving nonregistration, the court held that, in the absence of specific words
of exemption, investors are not denied coverage merely because they are sophisticated inves-
tors. Mark v. McDonnell & Co., 447 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1971). Accord, Martin v. Orvis Bros.
& Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 238, 323 N.E.2d 73 (1974)(Illinois securities act held designed to prevent
injury to the investing public and indicated a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability
for violation); Jenkins v. Dearborn Securities Corp., 42 111. App. 3d 20, 355 N.E.2d 341 (1976).
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The doctrine of laches is a second equitable principle applied
to actions for rescission of stock purchases:
A party to a contract for the purchase of stock may, of course, be
barred from maintenance of action for rescission by laches. He
must act promptly and must repudiate the contract within a rea-
sonable time after discovery of the facts entitling him to do so, or
he will be barred.
83
The plaintiff is chargeable with such knowledge as he might have
obtained upon inquiry, provided that the facts already known to
him were such as to put the duty of inquiry upon a man of ordinary
intelligence.84
The Arkansas Supreme Court in Schultz applied the doctrines
of equitable estoppel and laches, charging the plaintiffs with either
actual or constructive knowledge that the plan was subject to regis-
tration and that it was in fact unregistered from the time that they
entered into the transaction in 1972. The court also stated that
RPM, though an established and experienced real estate firm, did
not ordinarily deal in the securities field and could not be expected
to know that registration was required, while plaintiffs, on the other
hand, should have been more knowledgeable.
The court, citing Lane v. Midwest Bancshares Corp.,85 pointed
out that plaintiffs were experienced, well-educated businessmen
and registered stockbrokers who routinely maintained large per-
sonal investment portfolios. Pointing out that the Act is not invest-
ment insurance, the court said it was not fitting that the Arkansas
Securities Act should be applied to rescue plaintiffs from the results
of their own improvidence.8
The court found that defendants had been injured by plaintiffs'
delay in attempting to rescind for nonregistration and that plain-
tiffs' action was therefore barred by laches. The court stated that
prompt rescission would have allowed RPM to market the interest
to other buyers while a large front-end income tax deduction was
still available. 87 In addition, had plaintiffs raised the problem of
83. 12A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 5610 (rev. perm.
ed. 1972).
84. Smith v. Olin Industries, Inc., 224 Ark. 606, 612, 275 S.W.2d 439, 442 (1955).
85. 337 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
86. Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 788, 522 S.W.2d 4, 13 (1977).
87. Id. The IRS had disallowed a part of the plaintiff's claimed deductions, but, evi-
dently, a large deduction was still allowed. No figures are set out in the opinion. The dissent
points out that RPM violated the prospectus requirement, as well as the registration require-
ment, since the buyers did not receive the income tax deduction promised in the seller's
prospectus. Id. at 789, 552 S.W.2d at 15 (Byrd, J., dissenting).
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registration before the sale, an exemption could have been obtained
or the security could have been registered. In sum, the court rea-
soned that plaintiffs were barred by laches and estoppel from assert-
ing the technicality of RPM's failure to register the securities in
order to extricate themselves from an investment that had not
proved to be the profitable tax shelter they had expected.
While the result in this case is probably just, it seems to abro-
gate the registration requirements of the Arkansas Securities Act.
Under the Act the requirement of registration rests solely on the
seller,88 and it is an unusual maneuver to shift that burden to the
buyer by insisting that he make sure the security is registered before
buying it. Whether or not the doctrines of laches and equitable
estoppel support the conclusion in this case,89 the important point
is that in future cases equity may bar a purchaser from rescinding
a purchase of unregistered securities, in spite of the clear mandate
of the Act.
In Schultz the parties who sold unregistered securities and who
were experts in real estate investments were, in the final analysis,
not penalized for this violation of the Act. Furthermore, the buyers
are "stuck" with their interests in the project since, being registered
stock brokers, they could not sell or assign them for value without
committing a felony violation0 and risking the revocation of their
security licenses."
The court has thus delivered a strong warning to purchasers of
securities whose background may classify them as sophisticated and
experienced investors. Investors may not buy into projects or promo-
tional schemes and reap the tax (or other) benefits accruing from
ownership and decide years later whether to keep the securities or
88. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1241 (Repl. 1966). In General Life of Missouri Inv. Co. v.
Shamburger, 546 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1976), the court refused to enforce an executory subscrip-
tion contract for the sale of unregistered securities. The seller of the securities sought to
enforce the contract which violated the registration requirements of the Federal Securities
Act of 1933, § 5, as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e (1971). In refusing to enforce the contract,
the court said, "[WIhere the wrongdoer sues on the contract [to sell unregistered securi-
ties], enforcement may properly be denied even though the defendant apparently was aware
of the violation and to some extent may have participated therein." 546 F.2d at 784. The court
continued, "[T]he legislative purpose of protecting purchasers of securities would be frus-
trated if the subscription agreement were enforced in favor of GLMIC, a violator of the Act."
Id. One may speculate whether this decision will affect the Arkansas Supreme Court's han-
dling of nonregistration cases in the future.
89. The court cited no cases which applied equitable remedies to nonregistration cases.
The only securities case cited in this section of the opinion was Lane v. Midwest Bancshares
Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Ark. 1972), which involved fraud and misrepresentation.
90. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1255 (Repl. 1966).
91. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1240 (Repl. 1966).
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sue to recoup their money plus interest while retaining such bene-
fits. 92 Although the purpose of the Act is to protect investors,
Schultz explicitly emphasizes that not all investors are equal in the
eyes of law and equity. Implicit in the opinion is the suggestion that
an inexperienced purchaser placed in the same position would not
have been expected to inquire about registration; however, knowl-
edgeable investors, including stockbrokers, some lawyers, and some
accountants, will not be allowed to convert an unwise investment
into a successful court action.
Schultz suggests that the court in the future may construe
broadly the range of investment schemes which fall under regulation
of the Arkansas Securities Act as "investment contracts" to protect
the investing public, but will not deal leniently with the sophisti-
cated investor who should know what he is doing.
Anne P. Ritchey
92. Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 786, 552 S.W.2d 4, 13 (1977).
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